I study a game in which individuals gather costly information about an innovation and share their knowledge through social ties. A person's incentive to experiment varies with her position in the network, and strategic interactions lead to counterintuitive behavior among the most connected players. The structure of the social network and the distribution of initial beliefs jointly determine long-run adoption behavior in the broader group. Networks that share information efficiently converge on a decision more quickly but are more prone to errors. Consequently, dense or centralized networks can have more volatile outcomes in the long run, and efforts to seed adoption in the network should focus on individuals who are isolated from one another. * I am grateful to Roy Radner for many fruitful discussions about this project. I also thank Ilan Lobel, David Pearce, Elliot Lipnowski, and participants at the IESE Workshop on Learning in Social Networks for their comments and suggestions.
Introduction
Mounting evidence suggests that information transmission through social ties plays a central role in the diffusion and acceptance of innovations. Many studies of agricultural technologies emphasize the role of social learning in adoption decisions (Munshi, 2004; Conley and Udry, 2010) , and other work finds learning effects in domains ranging from health products (Dupas, 2014) and health plans (Sorensen, 2006) to investments (Duflo and Saez, 2003) and microfinance (Banerjee et al., 2013) . This research provides an understanding not only of the aggregate effects of learning on technology adoption, but the strategic choices individuals make when they can learn from others (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Kremer and Miguel, 2007) .
One reason that information from our friends and neighbors can influence our adoption decisions is uncertainty about the merits of an innovation. Experience using a new high yielding seed variety, or the latest smart phone, provides information regarding its value, but we face an opportunity cost to acquire this experience. Learning from friends and acquaintances complicates the choice of whether to experiment, and broader patterns of information sharing influence who experiments, how much, and ultimately whether society adopts the innovation.
We shall study a game that captures important aspects of social experimentation. Players in a fixed social network jointly face a two-armed bandit problem, and the players share with their neighbors any information that they gather. Our goal is to develop an intuitive understanding of how information sharing patterns affect both individual incentives to experiment and the collective choice to explore or exploit. I argue that network structure can have important, but nuanced effects on innovation adoption. In particular, without some knowledge of the distribution of initial beliefs, this structure has ambiguous implications for long run adoption. Individual beliefs determine who finds it worthwhile to experiment, and these beliefs interact with the network to shape outcomes. Nevertheless, the model suggests several regularities, offering insights on how the internal structure of groups or organizations may regulate collective behavior.
On a macro level, the network governs a fundamental tradeoff between disseminating information efficiently and encouraging more total experimentation. When information is quickly and broadly shared, people gather less information, and bad early experiences may cause the group as a whole to abandon a new technology. These groups are faster to eliminate bad innovations, but more likely to abandon good ones. This suggests that dense or centralized networks will experience more volatile outcomes-either shortly adopting the innovation throughout or abandoning it altogether-though this effect depends crucially on who the initial adopters are. I provide several examples to highlight important effects. One shows clearly how dense connectivity discourages experimentation. Beliefs tend to move together in a dense network since people learn from the same set of experiences This leads to early consensus and less double checking, which results in more errors. A second example demonstrates how central individuals can inhibit adoption in the long run. Counterintuitively, making a central player more optimistic about the innovation can make it less likely that the group adopts: the central player experiments more, and her experiences have a disproportionate influence on others. If the central player has a negative experience and quits experimenting, the rest of the group might abandon the innovation too. Finally, I consider how to "seed" an innovation in a network-that is, how to select key individuals to carry out experiments so that broader adoption becomes more likely. Clustering the seeds in one part of a network is self defeating; the seeds have correlated beliefs and they will quickly adopt or abandon together. Isolating early adopters from one another ensures that more independent information is gathered.
Two strategic effects are important for individual decisions: the free-rider effect and the encouragement effect. The ability to free-ride on others' experimentation discourages people from gathering information themselves, but good results today could encourage more experimentation by others tomorrow. Those with many neighbors experience both effects more strongly, and the interaction between the two effects leads to complicated behavior among the most well connected players. All players experiment with sufficiently optimistic beliefs. At moderate belief levels, the free-rider effect dominates for the high degree players. Those with many neighbors refrain from experimenting, allowing low degree players to gather information instead. At more pessimistic belief levels, the enouragement effect takes over. The highest degree players are the ones who experiment, while low degree players wait for some encouraging results.
Taken together, our findings can help us understand when adoption is more or less likely and when adoption is more or less difficult to predict. We have a framework to think about the tradeoffs that different group structures entail with regard to experimentation. The structure of the information sharing network affects individual incentives to gather information in predictable ways, and ultimately the total amount of information gathered determines the long term behavior of the group.
A broader contribution of the paper is a novel approach to studying games on networks. In an attempt to both capture realistic features of human reasoning and simplify the analysis, I introduce elements of bounded rationality into players' decision making. The players apply Bayes' rule to update their beliefs about the innovation, but a player's expectations about others' behavior are based on an incomplete or "local" model of the world that only includes her immediate neighbors. This way of forming expectations reflects the difficulty of reasoning about unknown individuals who are distant in the network. We can also see this as a middle road between fully rational expectations and the simpler heuristics that many authors use to study behavior in networks. Instead of choosing one extreme, we balance tractablity against our desire to understand incentives and strategies. The example of this paper can offer a template for other researchers to apply.
This model serves as a bridge between the growing literatures on social learning and strategic experimentation. A significant branch of the social learning literature has recently focused on the role network structure plays in disseminating and aggregating dispersed information, exploring the long-run efficiency of learning in large networks. These papers typically eliminate strategic aspects of learning, either assuming a sequential game in which all players act only once (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Lobel and Sadler, 2014) or employing a heuristic decision rule Jackson, 2010, 2012; Jadbabaie et al., 2012) . In contrast, the strategic experimentation literature centers on full observation settings in which all players observe the experimentation of all others, allowing a sharper focus on the strategic behavior of individuals (Bolton and Harris, 1999; Keller et al., 2005) . I unify several aspects of these models, studying a setting in which strategic decisions to gather information interact with the network structure to determine learning outcomes.
I build most directly on the work of Bolton and Harris (1999) and Bala and Goyal (1998) . I adopt the same continuous-time formulation of a two-armed bandit as Bolton and Harris (1999) with a more general information sharing structure; their strategic experimentation game becomes a special case of ours with a complete network and common initial beliefs about the innovation. As in this paper, Bala and Goyal (1998) study a model with local information acquisition and sharing in a general network, but players are myopic, always choosing the action with the highest current expected payoff. Players ignore the value of information and effects on other players, and the principal focus is on long run outcomes in very large networks. We go a step further, considering strategic players who assess the future implications of current decisions. Moreover, the results of section 4 enrich our understanding of aggregate outcomes in relatively small networks.
Less immediately, this work contributes to the study of information processing and organizational structure. One way to think about a firm is as a collection of information processors that takes inputs from the environment and produces decisions. Taking this view, we can see that the costs of communication, information processing, and delays in decision making have implications for how firms are organized and who makes which decisions (Radner, 1993; Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Garicano, 2000) . We build on this work, showing that incentives to gather information also have implications for the structure of organizations. If members have significant autonomy to decide how to carry out their work, then the way these individuals communicate with one another will partly determine how best practices diffuse within the organization. A firm that efficiently shares information should be quick to either eliminate or adopt new practices, while a firm organized into relatively isolated teams might appear more patient. An environment favoring one side of this tradeoff creates pressure to adopt particular internal structures.
For expositional clarity I first describe a discrete time version of the game before passing to the continuous time formulation that is the focus of our analysis. After describing the game, I introduce the notion of a local Bayesian equilibrium, giving some discussion of the assumptions and choices this approach entails. Section 3 analyzes individual behavior in equilibrium, and section 4 presents the main results on network structure and long-run outcomes. I conclude with a brief discussion.
The Experimentation Game
We begin in discrete time. We have N players, and in every period t, each of them faces a choice between two competing technologies: technology 0 is the "standard" technology, and technology 1 is the "innovation." Assume players can continuously allocate use between the two technologies in any period; that is, they can split their efforts between the two technologies in any way they choose. Imagine for instance a new crop variety that we can plant in some fraction of available land, using the remaining land for the old crop. For player i, let α i (t) ∈ [0, 1] denote the proportion of period t devoted to the innovation.
Player i's payoff in a period is the sum of two independent normally distributed random variables π 0 i (t) and π 1 i (t), representing the payoffs from the standard technology and the innovation respectively. If player i allocates a portion α i of effort to the innovation, her payoff from the standard technology has mean (1 − α i ) µ 0 and variance (1 − α i ) σ 2 , and her payoff from the innovation has mean α i µ 1 and variance α i σ 2 . The mean payoff from the standard technology µ 0 and the variance parameter σ are fixed and commonly known, while the innovation has unknown mean payoff µ 1 ∈ {L, H} with L < µ 0 < H. Players discount the future at a common rate 1 1+r ∈ (0, 1), and their goal is to maximize the discounted sum of present and future payoffs.
At the beginning of period t, player i believes that µ 1 = H with probability p i (t). Realized payoffs convey some information about µ 1 , with a higher α i (t) producing a more informative signal. In addition to her own effort allocation and payoffs, each player observes those of her neighbors in a social network. We represent this network as a directed graph G, using G ij ∈ {0, 1} to denote the corresponding entry in the adjacency matrix. If G ij = 1 we say that j is a neighbor of i, and at the end of each period player i observes the values α j (t) and π 1 j (t). We further assume that G ii = 1 for all i, and we let G i = {j | G ij = 1} denote the set of player i's neighbors. The value d i = |G i | − 1 is player i's degree, and F denotes the distribution of player degrees, which is common knowledge. 1 At the end of period t, player i observes {α j (t), π 1 j (t), ∀ j ∈ G i } and applies Bayes' rule to update her belief p i (t) to p i (t + 1).
To choose the best course of action, players must form expectations about how much their neighbors will experiment, and this is where cognitive limitations enter our model. In choosing these particular assumptions about the way players think, I aim to capture, as simply as possible, four intuitive features of the problem:
(a) Players form expectations about neighbors' experimentation decisions, and they assume their neighbors do the same;
(b) Players find it easier to form expectations about immediate neighbors than those more distant in the network;
(c) Neighbors' beliefs are likely higher (lower) when a player's beliefs are high (low); 2 (d) Direct experimental observations are more salient than the factors that led neighbors to choose a particular level of experimentation, particularly in light of (b).
Limiting the scope of reasoning about the network entails limiting the information players use to inform their strategies. If players condition their actions on fine details of a long history, then they must at least implicitly hold beliefs about what led their neighbors to choose the actions they did. That is, beliefs about neighbors of neighbors, neighbors of those neighbors, and so on. To avoid this, we shall restrict a player i to strategies that are functions only of her current belief p i (t), ignoring the history that led to this belief. We can imagine someone who finds it hard to remember the past precisely or finds it too costly to incorporate this information into a decision at each moment. This assumption means that the system as a whole behaves as a Markov chain with a vector of state variables {p i (t)} i≤N .
In predicting the beliefs of her neighbors, a player uses her own beliefs as a guide. We make a particularly simple assumption: a player supposes that her neighbors always share her belief. That is, at any time player i thinks that µ 1 = H with probability p i , she will act as if all of her neighbors j ∈ G i hold the belief p j = p i . In addition to capturing our intuition from point (c) above, these expectations could reflect the false consensus effect that psychological studies document (Ross et al., 1977) .
Finally, given the players' memory limitations, it seems especially difficult to infer any information from a neighbor's chosen level of experimentation, apart from that the realized payoffs provide. Although it could provide an additional way for players to learn, we assume that players ignore this source of information and update their beliefs using only the information that comes directly from experimental results. They do not infer anything more from neighbors' decisions to experiment. 3 To formalize the preceding discussion, we define a strategy for a player as a function s : [0, 1] → [0, 1], giving an experimental effort level α(p) for each possible belief p. We consider symmetry strategy profiles s(d, p) : N × [0, 1] → [0, 1], which specify an action for each player as a function of her degree and her belief. Given a symmetric strategy profile s, define the average level of experimentation for a random player with belief p as
Consequently, player i expects to observe total experimentation d i α s (p) + α i (p) in any period in which her initial beliefs are p i (t) = p. For any strategy she chooses, she expects her future beliefs to evolve as a Markov process, and the function α s (p) completely determines the transition probabilities if other players adopt the strategy profile s. We can therefore define player i's expected payoff from choosing the strategy s i as
The strategy profile s is a local Bayesian equilibrium if for each player i (or equivalently each possible degree
for all strategies s i . The discrete time model is easier to describe, but a continuous time version is easier to analyze. All formal results pertain to a continuous time model that we can view as an appropriate limit of discrete time models. 4 A player i must now continuously allocate effort α i (t) ∈ [0, 1] at each instant t to using the innovation, earning instantaneous payoffs
where {Z j i } is a collection of mutually independent standard Brownian motions. Her beliefs p i (t) are continuously updated on the basis of observed experimental outcomes. Given a strategy profile for the other players s, player i expects to observe total experimentation d i α s (p) + α i (p) at any instant she holds beliefs p i (t) = p. Given these expectations, player i chooses the strategy s i to maximize discounted expected utility
A strategy profile s(d, p) is a local Bayesian equilibrium if for each player i and each strategy
Discussion of Local Equilibrium
The solution concept in this paper expresses a notion of bounded rationality. Players use an imperfect procedure to form expectations about others' behavior. We restrict players to condition their actions on a limited set of variables-namely, their degrees and belief levels-and the players assume a distribution over these variables for their neighbors, given their own beliefs. We treat these distributions as given and immutable: they are part of the basic data of the game. In this sense, a players' beliefs about her neighbors at each instant are similar to prior beliefs, even though they change dynamically over time.
Unlike other approaches to bounded or costly rationality, an advantage here is that analysis of players' decisions becomes simpler, rather than more complex. A player's reasoning about the network is constrained to her local neighborhood, so we can represent her beliefs using no details beyond the degree distribution. Importantly, other aspects of the network structure will still impact aggregate outcomes. A comparison to other boundedly rational solution concepts, such as k-level reasoning (e.g. Rubinstein, 1989) or analogy based expectations Jehiel (2005) , may prove illuminating. Our players exhibit a bounded depth of reasoning regarding the network, as opposed to a bounded depth of reasoning regarding the belief hierarchy. The notions are related but distinct. Our players implicitly hold infinitely many orders of beliefs, but the hierarchy is incomplete: a player has beliefs about her neighbors and beliefs about her neighbors' beliefs about their neighbors, but she does not hold her own distinct beliefs about the neighbors of her neighbors. There is also an element of coarse reasoning as players always treat each neighbor as having an average degree, despite any observations over the course of the game.
There are two ways to view our bounded rationality assumptions. One is to take these assumptions as descriptive of real human behavior, or at least as a better description than fully rational expectations. There is some empirical support for this view (Chandrasekhar et al., 2012; Corazzini et al., 2012) , finding that simple heuristics based on local updating rules can better account for observed behavior in social networks. Any similarity between reasoning to a limited depth in a network and limited depth reasoning in a belief hierarchy means that the literature studying the latter (e.g. Stahl and Wilson, 1995) bolsters this perspective.
A second view is that these assumptions represent a reasonable approach to dealing with the real constraints, both cognitive and environmental, that players face. Updating beliefs over a large network of players is a significant challenge, rendering the costs of memory and computation highly non-trivial. Moreover, such a complex problem necessitates that players restrict their thinking to a relatively limited set of the most salient variables. Though player reasoning is imperfect, note that if G is a complete network and players share the same initial beliefs, our model coincides exactly with that of Bolton and Harris (1999) . This suggests that players do not stray far from full rationality, and our slight relaxation allows fruitful analysis of a novel problem.
Our experimentation game offers an instantiation of a more general framework for modeling games on networks in which we constrain players to condition behavior on a limited set of locally observable variables. In the present paper, players condition on degrees and the belief levels {p i (t)}, but we could model a more general space of player types. A player considers only the behavior of a limited set of neighbors who directly impact her payoff. She forms beliefs about each neighbor's type, and a strategy profile giving actions as a function of type induces expectations on each neighbor's action. We can then define a local Bayesian equilibrium as above. This framework entails a number of modeling choices regarding what variables are salient and what players' local beliefs are, necessitating some caution in any application. We can think of this as a relatively sophisticated heuristic decision process that captures some important aspects of rational behavior. I examine the general framework in more detail in a forthcoming paper.
Individual Decisions and Local Equilibrium
I first characterize how beliefs evolve in response to experimentation and derive a Bellman equation expressing players' expected payoffs as a function of their beliefs. These are analogous to results of Bolton and Harris (1999) , and I relegate the proofs to an appendix.
Define Φ(p) = p(1 − p) H−L σ , let ν p ≡ (1 − p)L + pH denote the expected payoff from the risky action under belief p, and let b ≡ µ 0 −L H−L denote the value of p for which ν p = µ 0 . The following lemma describes belief evolution of player i as a function of the action profile {α j } N j=1 .
Lemma 1. The random process p i (t) evolves as
This lemma implies that, conditional on players' actions, the instantaneous change in beliefs dp i (t) is normally distributed with mean zero and variance Φ (p i (t)) j∈G i α j (t)dt. Given a strategy profile s for the other players, player i anticipates a normally distributed belief change with mean zero and variance Φ (p i (t)) (α i (t) + d i α s (p)) dt. This leads us to a Bellman equation describing the expected payoff from playing a best reply values to a given strategy profile.
Lemma 2. Suppose the players j = i adopt the strategy profile s. The value function for player i is the unique solution of
Lemma 2 also implicitly defines the best reply strategy profile s * . From the Bellman equation for the value function u, we can see that a strategy profile s * is a best reply to s if and only if
(1) This expression neatly captures the factors that influence the decision to experiment. The threshold µ 0 − ν p is the opportunity cost of experimentation, while the term Φ(p) 2r ∂ 2 u ∂p 2 (d, p) represents the value of experimentation. This value comprises the discount factor 1 r , the informativeness of experimentation Φ(p), and the shadow value of information 1 2 ∂ 2 u ∂p 2 (d, p). An optimal strategy experiments whenever the value of experimentation exceeds the opportunity cost and refrains whenever this value is lower than the cost.
Properties of Equilibrium Strategies
The Bellman equation in Lemma 2 directly implies several useful properties of the value function.
Lemma 3. Let s andŝ denote two strategy profiles, and let u andû denote the value functions associated with playing best replies to s andŝ respectively. We have
(c) If s ≥ŝ, then u ≥û; Proof. Property (a) is immediate since the upper bound is the complete information payoff, and the lower bound is attained using a myopic strategy. For property (b), observe that the Bellman equation defining u implies
with at least one equality. Suppose the first is an equality. If α s (p) = 0, then u(d, p) = µ 0 ; a minimum is attained, so we must have ∂ 2 u ∂p 2 (d, p) ≥ 0. Otherwise,
Now suppose the second holds with equality. This implies Φ(p) 2r
Hence, property (b) holds everywhere. For property (c), the function u solves
Comparing with the Bellman equation definingû shows that u ≥û. Property (d) follows analogously.
The final three properties all constitute different ways of saying that information has value. Payoffs are increasing in neighbors' experimentation, so a player benefits from either having more neighbors or having neighbors that engage in more experimentation. Figure 1 shows the value function for a typical player; the upper line is the full information payoff (1 − p)µ 0 + pH, and the lower line is the myopic payoff max(µ 0 , ν p ). Lemma 3 implies that the value function is convex and increasing in p as shown in the figure. The slope of the myopic payoff line provides an upper bound H − L on the derivative of u. Furthermore, since Φ(p) converges to zero as p approaches zero, the value of experimenting does as well, and no player experiments below some positive belief level.
Using Lemma 3 together with the best reply characterization, we can infer that the highest degree players begin experimenting at more pessimistic belief levels than all other players. In this sense, high degree players are the "early adopters" when people are initially skeptical of the innovation. These players are more willing to take risks at low belief levels because they have the most to gain from promising results. This shows the dominance of the encouragement effect at low belief levels: high degree players are willing to experiment because it may induce their neighbors to gather even more information. There are two ways to see the free-rider effect and the encouragement effect in this characterization. First, we can understand the effects via the expected neighbor experimentation α s (p). An increase in α s (p) directly reduces the best reply profile s * by increasing the decision threshold; this is the free-rider effect. However, Lemma 3 implies that utility increases, so there is a corresponding increase in β that shifts s * in the opposite direction. We can also see the two effects at work across different player degrees. Increases in d raise the denominator of β(d, p) , expressing a stronger free-rider effect that discourages experimentation. The encouragement effect appears in the numerator of β(d, p) as u(d, p) increases.
Although for any particular player the relative importance of the two effects is ambiguous, for any fixed p the free-rider effect clearly dominates for sufficiently high player degrees because u is bounded above by (1 − p)µ 0 + pH. In an extreme case, we could consider an infinite network in which F has full support on N. Proposition 2 then implies that for any p < b, all players with sufficiently high degree must refrain from experimenting. In light of Proposition 1, this highlights the complex interplay between the encouragement and freerider effects in a network: equilibrium strategies are non-monotone in beliefs. High degree players have the most to gain both from free-riding and from encouraging; they are the first to start experimenting, but they may drop out when others join. 
Existence of Equilibrium

Long Run Collective Behavior
While beliefs about immediate neighbors determine individual decisions, the broader context may have implications for aggregate welfare and the long run success or failure of innovations. I focus here on asymptotic outcomes of the learning process and how the network G impacts these outcomes. In particular, I analyze the likelihood that players discard a good innovation and the total amount of experimentation they expend on bad innovations. Definition 1. If lim t→∞ α i (t) = 1 (0), we say player i adopts (abandons) the innovation. If all players adopt (abandon) the innovation, we say that society adopts (abandons) the innovation. Let A 0 denote the event that society abandons the innovation and A 1 the event that society adopts the innovation.
The total experimentation of player i through time t is
The total experimentation in society through time t is
Long-run behavioral conformity is a robust feature of this model. Theorem 2. If G is connected, then with probability one either society adopts the innovation or society abandons the innovation. That is,
Proof. From Lemma 1, the beliefs of each player evolve according to a martingale, so they must converge almost surely. Since Φ(p) is positive on (0, 1), this means for each player i either lim t→∞ p i (t) ∈ {0, 1} or j∈G i α j (t) converges to zero. The former implies that player i learns the true state, while the latter implies that the player and all neighbors abandon the innovation. Since a player who learns the true state either abandons or adopts the innovation, according to whether the limit belief is 0 or 1, each individual player must with probability one either abandon or adopt the innovation.
Suppose one player adopts the innovation. Since this player continues experimenting indefinitely, she learns the true state, and continuing to experiment is optimal only if the true state is H. All players observing this experimentation must also learn that the true state is H, and will therefore also adopt the innovation. Iterating the argument over a connected network implies that all players adopt the innovation. The only other possibility is that all abandon the innovation.
Theorem 2 is similar in spirit to payoff equalization results in the social learning literature using both Bayesian and Non-Bayesian approaches. In this boundedly rational framework, players still consistently estimate the underlying state, and the same intuition applies. Since continuing to experiment means learning the true value of the innovation, one adopting player means the innovation must be good, and all players eventually learn this in a connected network. In case of adoption, players reach a belief consensus, but this need not occur if the innovation is abandoned. Some players will quit using the innovation before others, those with different degrees will have different belief thresholds for abandonment, and some may observe additional negative information their neighbors gather. When a player quits using the innovation, this occurs after observing a finite amount of experimentation, implying an asymmetry between outcomes in the two states.
Corollary 1. If the innovation is bad, society abandons it with probability one. If the innovation is good, society abandons it with positive probability. We have
This asymmetry motivates two long-run metrics that I study. First, I consider how the network structure affects the probability of abandoning a good innovation P(A 0 | µ 1 = H). This is a first order concern for a patient social planner, and a variation of this question is the focus in a large segment of the social learning literature. Although bad innovations are always abandoned eventually, we may also care about how much total experimentation η(∞) occurs before a bad innovation is rejected. In general, there is a direct tradeoff between minimizing the probability of abandoning a good innovation and minimizing the experimentation required to stop using a bad one.
Suppose s is an equilibrium strategy profile, and define the threshold p d = sup{p : s(d, p) = 0}.
If player i abandons the innovation, we must have p i ≤ p d i . Now define
and let Y denote the corresponding vector of thresholds. We can think of Y i as a measure of how much bad news player i can tolerate before stopping experimentation. Consider the linear program
We obtain the following bounds.
Theorem 3. Let y * denote the minimal objective value for the problem (3). We have
Proof. I introduce an alternative representation of belief evolution in the network. The experimentation of player i at time t generates a normally distributed signal X i (η i (t)) with mean η i (t)µ 1 and variance η i (t)σ 2 . Given a realization of X i , the associated likelihood ratio is
We shall focus on the logarithm of the likelihood ratio process Y i (t) = ln l i (t). Conditional on the realization of µ 1 , this process is a time-changed Brownian motion with drift. The total experimentation η i is the "clock" of the Brownian motion, and hereafter I shall write Y i as a function of η i . Conditional on µ 1 = L we have
where B i is a standard Brownian motion. Similarly, conditional on µ 1 = H we have
Note the processes {Y i } i≤N are mutually independent conditional on the experimentation levels. All dependencies stem from correlated experimentation rates. I note two well-known facts about Brownian motions that will prove useful. First, let X(t) = σB(t)+µt be a Brownian motion with drift µ < 0 and variance σ 2 t. Suppose X(0) = 0, and let M = max t≥0 X(t) denote the maximum the process attains. The probability that M is above some threshold x > 0 is
This will allow us to bound the probability of abandonment. If we suppose instead that the drift µ is positive, then the expected hitting time of x > 0 is
This will allow us to bound the expected total experimentation. The belief of agent i at time t is
and note that
is necessary for player i to abandon the innovation. Suppose µ 1 = H, and let x be an N -dimensional real vector. The probability that we ever have Y ≥ x is no more than
The linear program 3 exactly maximizes this probability subject to the necessary condition for abandonment. Similarly, conditional on µ 1 = L, the expected total experimentation that player i observes must satisfy
The same linear program describes minimal expected experimentation in the network.
Theorem 3 directly ties the probability of abanonment and the expected total experimentation to the network structure and the distribution of initial beliefs. The proof offers as much insight as the statement. We can interpret the objective vector Y as a scaled allocation of experimental effort that leads to abandonment. The constraint GY ≥ Y represents a bound on the amount of experimentation each player must observe before abandoning the innovation. As a general rule, we minimize total experimentation when we allocate effort to those who are most widely observed. Such allocations induce the greatest shifts in societal beliefs for a given amount of experimentation. Some examples will illustrate the broader implications of these findings.
Network Density
Define G i = {j | G ji = 1} as the set of players who observe player i, and consider a network in which all players have the same visibility: we have |G i | = k for all i and some integer k. If we further suppose that each player i begins the game with beliefs p i (0) ≥ p d i , the optimization problem (3) now admits a particularly simple solution: if y = 1 N i≤N Y i , then the minimum is simply y k . Theorem 3 implies the following scaling result. Corollary 2. Suppose |G i | = k for each i, and the average abandonment threshold is y. We have
Fixing the distribution of degrees and initial beliefs, the probability of suboptimal abandonment declines exponentially with the size of the network, and the total experimentation increases linearly. The exponent and the slope in the respective bounds are smaller when the network is more dense. This indicates that on average dense networks experiment less, making more long-run mistakes.
A comparison with the complete network is instructive. Assuming that p i (0) = p 0 for each i, the results of Bolton and Harris (1999) imply that
where ζ = 1 + 8rσ 2 N (H−L) 2 . This means the probability of abandonment declines no faster than 1 N , and the expected total experimentation scales at most logarithmically. The different scaling rate reflects that for large N , networks with bounded degrees become increasingly sparse relative to the complete network, requiring relatively more information before abandoning an innovation.
Centralized Experimentation
Consider the two networks in Figure 2 . In network (a), players each observe a single neighbor, forming a ring structure, while network (b) has a central player whom all others observe. To simplify the example, imagine that the central player in network (b) observes and is observed by a single other player with initial belief zero; hence, all players have the same degree in both networks, and all face the same individual decision problem. Suppose all players in network (a) and all peripheral players in network (b) have the same initial beliefs p 0 > p, where p is the threshold at which players cease experimenting. Define
Corollary 2 implies that in network (a), we have
where N is the number of players in the ring. Compare this with network (b) as we vary the initial beliefs p c 0 of the central player. If p c 0 < p, the central player will never experiment, and the likelihood of total abandonment e −yN is less than in network (a) because all of the peripheral players experiment independently. Now consider what happens if the central player has a much higher initial belief. Let A denote the event that the central player abandons a good innovation, and let P a denote the probability that a peripheral player abandons a good innovation conditional on A. The probability that network (b) abandons a good innovation is then at least P(A)P N a ,
Figure 2: Centralized Experimentation
where N is the number of peripheral players. As p c 0 approaches 1, event A implies more negative experimental results; fixing p 0 , we have P a approaching 1. In particular, for sufficiently high p c 0 , we have P a > e − y 2 , which means that for sufficiently large N , the probability of abandonment in network (b) is greater than that in network (a).
Central players can create more correlation in the abandonment decisions of others. In this example, if the central player carries out a lot of experimentation with negative results, all peripheral players observe this, and all of them are far more likely to abandon the innovation. 5 Since beliefs determine experimentation, whether the central player introduces these correlations depends crucially on her initial beliefs. Perhaps counterintuitively, increasing one player's perceived value of an innovation may end up reducing its ultimate likelihood of adoption.
Seeding
Suppose that all players in a network begin with extremely pessimistic beliefs p 0 = > 0. Now imagine that we can "seed" the network by exogenously increasing the beliefs of a subset of players. This type of seeding could represent an intervention via an educational program or subsidies. How should we select individuals for the intervention if our goal is to maximize the likelihood of long-run adoption? Figure 3 illustrates two possible seedings in a particularly simple network. Let p denote the belief threshold below which individuals stop experimenting, suppose the red nodes are seeded with the belief level p 0 > p, and define y = ln 1 − p p − ln 1 − p 0 p 0 .
5 The role of the central player here is similar to that of a "Royal Family" in the model of Bala and Goyal (1998) .
Figure 3: Seeding Strategies
Since the unseeded nodes have such low belief levels, we can essentially ignore them in estimating the probability of abandonment: if one of the seeds adopts, the network will eventually adopt, otherwise the innovation is abandoned.
In seeding (a), there are two independent chances to adopt, and the probability of abandoning a good innovation is approximately e −2y . In seeding (b), the two seeds share identical beliefs unless and until the unseeded players join in using the innovation. Since their beliefs move together, we in essence have only one seed, and the probability of abandoning a good innovation is approximately e −y . Placing seeds adjacent to each other in this network eliminates independent experimentation and therefore reduces the amount of information the network will gather. More generally, when seeds share information with one another, their decisions to adopt or abandon are positively correlated, and this can reduce the long-term likelihood of adoption
Discussion
Information sharing networks are important drivers of innovation diffusion in firms, communities, and other organizations. When individuals must engage in costly experimentation to learn about an innovation, the network structure has complex effects on incentives to gather information and on long term adoption patterns. A key tradeoff occurs between gathering information and efficiently sharing information. The network structure and individual beliefs jointly determine how the group as a whole conducts this tradeoff. When individuals who are separated from one another gather most of the information, the group is less likely to reject useful innovations, but it takes longer to eliminate inferior ones.
These findings have implications for seeding innovations within skeptical communities. In contexts requiring individuals to experiment and learn about a new technology, seeding individuals in relative isolation, rather than in clusters, may render long-run acceptance more likely. This recommendation contrasts with our intuition for seeding strategies when local payoff externalities influence adoption decisions. In these cases, the decision to adopt is part of a local coordination game, and a behavior or technology will quickly die out if early adopters are isolated from one another. 6 This suggests that identifying the mechanisms of peer influence in different contexts is important for designing appropriate interventions.
Information sharing patterns partly determine the extent to which a group gathers information before its members collectively accept or reject an innovation. In this sense, we can interpret network structure as an expression of collective time or risk preference. Sparse information sharing networks correspond to groups that are relatively patient or less risk averse regarding new technologies or practices. When jobs within a firm or other organization require risky experimentation by individuals, the structure of the organization may play a role in aligning individual incentives with organizational objectives.
The notion of a local Bayesian equilibrium is a novel contribution in this paper. This solution concept requires us to think carefully about how we specify players' beliefs; in this game, we sought simple and transparent assumptions that reflect intuitive features of the problem. The power of this approach lies in simplifying the analysis of individual choices while preserving key aspects of rational decision making. Players follow a relatively sophisticated heuristic that we can use to better understand strategic behavior in complex settings.
